Just in case you’re one of the few folks who is interested in FAA issues and hasn’t heard of this… be sure to watch ABC news tonight. They’re running a story on the ATO’s big manager pow-wow in Atlanta.

FWIW, every single supervisor that I’ve talked with at ZSE has said the Atlanta meeting was a huge waste of time and money. Many of them also thought the St Louis conferences were a big waste of time and money.

A couple of links to the story:

http://abcnews.go.com/WN/conversation-diane-sawyer-brian-ross/story?id=9402832
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/party-time-faa-critics-question-million-gathering/story?id=9390933&page=1

So there ya go. Tune in tonight!

The line between stupidity and delusions is a thin one at times. We have two good examples in the FAA this week.

Stupid is… the manager of a smaller up/down facility in the Midwest who put out a memo banning visitors to the facility because “the FAA is asking managers to take precautionary measures to protect Agency employees by minimizing potential exposure to the H1N1 and other viruses.”

It’s almost delusional to think that this is somehow going to limit the odds of employees getting the swine flu. Say a facility sees 5 visitors a week (and that’s an optimistic estimate for many facilities; most don’t see that many) who now will not be allowed into the facility. How many people do you think an individual is exposed to in a DAY? How about in a single trip to the grocery store, how many people do you think you’re exposed to? 15? 20? 40?

So plainly, banning visitors to the facility is stupid in terms of sheer numbers. Also, visitors to a facility generally don’t put their hands on the equipment that the controllers are using- their headsets, keyboards, trackballs and mice, strip holders, etc. The most common way to transmit/receive the flu or cold viruses is through touching things that other people have touched, and then touching your face. (The easiest way to reduce your risk to colds/flu… wash your hands frequently and don’t touch your face.)

And the manager proved his stupidity by promptly breaking the rule that he established when he brought his own child into the facility after his ban. He had to go in for something during non-traditional hours and apparently had no babysitter, so he just toted the child in with him. Said child doesn’t work for the FAA, of course, so he’s a visitor, and therefore should be banned…

…but of course we all know that rules established by FAA managers don’t actually APPLY to them, only to their subordinates.

The good news is that stupidity can, despite the “you can’t fix stupid” joke, can be cured or at least mediated. That’s often a large part of the union’s job- stopping managers from their stupidity.

Tune in Friday for an example of delusional FAA thought.

So yesterday we discussed how the FLM/CIC position is filled. The FAA’s stance on this is that they need to have FLMs in that position of overseeing the operation as much as possible, and I pointed out how if that’s the case they need to pay controllers extra for when they take on the responsibility of CIC.

The 10% differential that CICs got paid when they were in that role went away with the FAA’s imposition of the White Book. This meant that from the FAA’s point of view, they might just as well use controllers in that role as much as possible, because it doesn’t cost them anything extra.

This is unfair from the controllers’ point of view, because our staffing requirements for a given area (or tower, etc) are based on how many *control* positions are typically open and working and needed, and don’t count the CIC position.

The CIC position is something we should only be doing occasionally, and in general it should be up to the FLMs to staff that position.

Unfortunately, the FAA’s policy is such that they wind up abusing their controller workforce greatly.

In some facilities, since there’s so few people, any time the FLM is gone they must use a CIC to cover. That means that the FLM and the controllers are effectively one workforce.

Additionally, since they’re small, they can only allot a single slot for vacation leave per day. As soon as any controller takes the vacation leave slot for that day, that’s it; there’s no more leave slots available.

So you’d think that, in a fair and just FAA, it’d be simple- the FLM’s vacation leave slots would be bid along with the controllers, with everyone taking a turn, right?

Sadly, the FAA is not fair and just. The FAA, put bluntly, doesn’t give a damn about its workforce; the FAA managers instead protect their own. Their attitude is “screw you, we got ours.”

In at least one facility, the way it’s done is that the FLM puts in his first vacation request… then his second vacation request… time off for Oshkosh in case he or a controller gets selected for that… time off for any National Guard training dates (of controllers) he’s aware of… any special event weekends at that airport he knows of… and any other days that he wants off.

So basically, by being a FLM, this guy gets to schedule whatever days off he wants. If he were a controller, he’d be #5 out of 8 in the workforce in terms of seniority, but instead he gets to jump past people for who literally have twice as long in the FAA when it comes to getting vacation time.

Screw you, we got ours.

So say you’re number 4 on the seniority list in that facility. By the time you get to bid your FIRST two weeks of vacation leave, you’ve already seen this FLM cherrypick any days off he wanted from the entire year. Then your fellow controllers who are #1, 2, and 3 all pick from what’s left for their first two weeks, and finally you get your chance.

By this point, at least 6 and as many as 10 or 12 weeks of the year are gone in terms of vacation. It’d be one thing if it were just the fellow controllers; at least that’s fair, because they only get to pick two weeks at a shot and they only got to do their first round of bidding.

But some FLM, who has less time in the FAA overall, winds up getting to pick whatever he wants, simply because he’s management.

As if the fact that management didn’t take a pay cut and management didn’t see their pay scales lowered and management continues to get annual inflation increases and management continued to get step increases and management generally took all the money weren’t enough, they’re also screwing their workforce when it comes to time off.

There are multiple facilities in the nation where this happens, for that matter.

I have to admit that it’s somewhat surprising to me that the FAA is #214 out of 216 federal agencies to work for.

I’m surprised we’re not dead last.

I wish that’s what the headline read. Unfortunately, in government-ese, that’s a tad too blunt, and instead of just laying it out there like that, we read stuff that comes across differently.

But I’m getting ahead of myself. Let me back up a minute here.

There are meteorologists- real ones, not the guys you see in TV- who work in the FAA’s enroute control centers. Here at Seattle Center (ZSE), for example, we’ve got 4 or 5 of them. (Or maybe it’s 3, can’t recall for sure right now.) They are National Weather Service Employees; they have advanced degrees and often decades of experience in forecasting weather, particularly in the local areas that they cover.

Again, as an example, ZSE has some interesting and weird airspace and weather conditions; the Puget Sound convergence zone, for example, can be the difference between an arrival rate as low as 32 or as much as 44, just depending on how the winds come together over our heads. Our weather folks are pretty dang good at making the call on what’s going on, when the fog will get bad or get better, etc.

Where did these meteorologists come from? Why, I’m glad you asked. From the FAA’s Chronological History for April 17, 1978 (and with a hat tip to Don Brown, who’s a bit of a nut for the FAA’s history document):

Apr 17, 1978: National Weather Service meteorologists began working at 13 of FAA’s Air Route Traffic Control Centers under a recently signed agreement between the two agencies. At each of those centers, a team of three NWS meteorologists provided information on hazardous weather throughout the day to center controllers, as well as to FAA towers and flight service stations. FAA provided each center with new equipment for receiving data from NWS weather radar and satellites. This new program was part of a general effort to provide pilots with more en route weather information, since the lack of accurate knowledge of hazardous weather, particularly thunderstorms, had been found responsible for several air crashes (see May 19, 1977). NWS meteorologists were already on duty at FAA’s national flow control center in Washington, and by Nov 1980 they were stationed at all U.S. mainland en route centers.

Hmmm… when you go to the entry for May 19, 1977, it refers to crashes on July 23, 1973 and April 4, 1977. Let’s have a quick look at those entries, shall we?

Jul 23, 1973: An Ozark Airlines Fairchild-Hiller 227B crashed 2.3 miles from St. Louis airport, killing 38 of the 44 persons aboard. The National Transportation Safety Board cited the probable cause as encounter with a downdraft following the captain’s decision to conduct an instrument approach during a thunderstorm. This decision was probably influenced by lack of a timely severe weather warning from the National Weather Service and the improper assessment of weather conditions by flightcrew and flight dispatcher. The Board’s recommendations included a system to improve the dissemination of severe weather information.

Apr 4, 1977: A Southern Airways DC-9 crashed near New Hope, Ga. The pilot attempted an emergency landing on a highway, but the aircraft broke apart and caught fire. The accident killed 62 of the 85 persons aboard, as well as 8 persons on the ground. In addition, one passenger and one person injured on the ground died about a month later. The National Transportation Safety Board cited the probable cause of the crash as the total and unique loss of thrust after the engines ingested massive amounts of water and hail as the aircraft penetrated an area of severe thunderstorms. As contributory causes, the NTSB listed: failure of the airline’s dispatch system to provide up-to-date severe weather data; the captain’s reliance on airborne weather radar to enter a thunderstorm area; and FAA’s lack of a system for disseminating real-time hazardous weather warnings.

So what we learn from history (unless we’re stupid and think we don’t have anything to learn from history, which means we’re doomed to repeat it) is that the FAA needs a system for identifying, recognizing, and disseminating information about severe and hazardous weather. This needs to be quick, responsive, and effective, because if it isn’t, people on airplanes and even people on the ground die.

The FAA has wanted, for several years, to get rid of the meteorologists that work in the enroute control centers.

Why? Well, you can guess- because they cost money. The FAA’s plan is to consolidate these weather folks into just two locations, one in College Park, Maryland, and the other in Kansas City. This will save a bunch of money because the agency figures we won’t need as many of these meteorologists, and they’ll be able to serve the entire nation.

Naturally, the unions supporting the meteorologists aren’t happy about this move. Bad enough that some of them would lose their jobs under the plan, but those that are left would have to uproot their families and lives to move across the nation.

The National Air Traffic Controllers Association, the controllers’ union, is also against this plan. Why? Union solidarity? No… because they know what any person with common sense knows: This plan will lead to reduced service quality and availability.

This all leads me to what a government expert on the matter had to say about the FAA’s plan:

The FAA and the NWS “have not defined a common outcome, established joint strategies to achieve the outcome, or agreed upon agency responsibilities,” according to David A. Powner, GAO’s director of information technology management issues.

“Any changes to the current structure could degrade aviation operations and safety — and the agencies may not know it,” according to his prepared testimony.

Or, as I would put it… these clowns don’t know what they’re doing.

They don’t know what the “outcome” of this is (in other words, they don’t even really know why they’re doing it).

They don’t have strategies to get to the outcome that they don’t have. (In other words, they don’t even know how they’re going to get to the outcome that they haven’t defined yet.)

They don’t have any agreement that defines who’s responsible for what. (In other words, nobody can be blamed for not doing their jobs- because nobody’s jobs are actually defined.)

And the coup de grace- changing what we have now might lead to reduced safety and worse operations, and the FAA and NWS wouldn’t know it if that happened. (No translation needed on this one.)

Is it any wonder that the employees of the FAA (and, for that matter, the NWS) have so little faith in their leadership?

This is the kind of crap that’s happened all over the FAA over the past several years. Some managerial type gets a wild hair up their butt; they see how much money is going to, say, meteorologists, and they figure “hey, if we fired a bunch of them and moved the rest all to one or two places, we could just do the weather from there and save a bunch of money!” Boom, that’s the plan.

No consideration of what they’re actually doing. No consideration of how those meteorologists got there in the first place. No consideration of whether or not a guy sitting in Kansas City, responsible for trying to predict the weather across the United States west of the Mississippi, can possibly describe to the folks at ZSE whether or not the convergence zone will settle in over Everett (meaning a 44 rate at SEA) or if it’ll be over the airport (meaning a 28 rate and possible go-arounds).

And when the agency’s employees try to point this out to the leadership, they’re seen as being annoyances that are merely trying to cause trouble. Their concerns are blown off because “that’s just the union talking”.

These clowns don’t know what they’re doing.

One thing about the FAA’s desire to bust people for… well, for nearly anything is that the upper managers are occasionally doing it even to their own. Yes, in most facilities supervisors (or “front line managers”, aka “FLM”, aka “phlegms”) are allowed to get away with anything and everything, but in some facilities the upper poo-bahs are being just as irrational with the FLMs as they are with controllers (and technicians, and FSDO inspectors, and engineers…)

I just heard a story from one center about two different FLMs getting the beat-down put onto them. Both are long-time employees of the FAA, never caused a problem, do a decent job of running their crews, been supes for a long time (ie, before the White Book).

One guy screwed up on his leave towards the end of the year and accidentally used more than he had, meaning he got dinged with LWOP. It was a day (8 hours) or less. Proposed punishment: Three-day suspension.

Come on. Guy’s got around two DECADES of time in the FAA, makes an honest (stupid, but honest) mistake, and they clobber him like that? Give me a break. I know some people will say “screw him, he’s a supe” but I don’t care who you are- that’s just not right to do to anyone. If they knew for a fact that he did it intentionally (and he didn’t- it was just a mistake, he thought this was a year with 27 pay periods in it for some reason) I could see punishing him- but docking 24 hours’ worth of pay?

I hope he has a good vacation on those days.

The other guy was accused of faking his sign-in log because his prox card didn’t swipe in until after the time he’d signed in. Problem was, LOTS of people wind up in this spot; if you walk up to a door at the same time as someone else, they use their card, you don’t use yours, and now there’s no record of you entering the building.

I haven’t heard what, if any, penalty they smacked that guy with, but who cares? They’re nitpicking stuff like this, and meanwhile you’ve got REAL problems in the FAA all around you?

Supes or not, everyone in the FAA deserves to be treated better than this. Too bad it’s not happening.

I tell you what- Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood cannot hurry fast enough to change the culture at the FAA. The culture of secrecy, of hiding information from the public, of keeping things to ourselves…

The recent flyby of Manhattan by one of the 747s used as Air Force One, and the FAA telling the local authorities to NOT release any information about it, is a perfect example of how stupid the FAA’s leadership culture is. There’s lots of recriminations right now about the decision to allow the flyby at all.

Louis Caldera, director of the White House Military Office, quickly apologized for Monday’s incident after the planes prompted workers and residents to evacuate buildings in New York and New Jersey.

“Last week, I approved a mission over New York. I take responsibility for that decision,” Caldera said. “While federal authorities took the proper steps to notify state and local authorities in New York and New Jersey, it’s clear that the mission created confusion and disruption.”

The Federal Aviation Administration said the aircraft, which functions as Air Force One when the president is aboard, was taking part in a classified, government-sanctioned photo shoot.

Let’s be clear about something right now- there’s nothing at all wrong with the flyby. The White House aide that’s being scolded (Caldera), and being marched out on orders from above to apologize for the decision, did nothing wrong, in my opinion.

What was wrong is found here (later in the same article):

Capt. Anna Carpenter of Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland said local law enforcement agencies and the FAA had been given notice of the exercise.

New York Police Deputy Commissioner Paul J. Browne said the department had been alerted about the flight “with directives to local authorities not to disclose information about it.”

More reaction from the Mayor of New York City, Michael Bloomberg, here:

In unusually harsh language, the mayor criticized the Defense Department for conducting the exercise and the Federal Aviation Administration for being secretive about it.

Jim Peters, an F.A.A. spokesman, said “the photo op was approved and coordinated with everyone.” Notification was made in advance to the mayor’s office, “including its 911 and 311 operation centers,” the New York City Police Department, the New Jersey State Police, the United States Park Police and other agencies, he said.

The Police Department confirmed that it had been notified about the event but said it had been barred from alerting the public. “The flight of a VC-25 aircraft and F-16 fighters this morning was authorized by the F.A.A. for the vicinity of the Statue of Liberty with directives to local authorities not to disclose information about it but to direct any inquiries to the F.A.A. Air Traffic Security Coordinator,” the Police Department said in a statement.

The mayor criticized the secrecy around the flyover. The e-mail notification “did have the normal language of saying this is sensitive information, should be distributed on a need-to-know basis, that they did not plan to have any publicity about it, which I think is ridiculous and just poor judgment,” Mr. Bloomberg said.

(Side note: Jim Peters still has a job?)

The reality is this: The FAA needs to change its culture, as I’ve said before. We’re not in the Bush/Cheney era of hiding information from the public anymore.

Imagine, if instead of the panic we saw with this, if the day before the flyover the various news media outlets in NYC had been informed of the plans. They would have mentioned it in newscasts, and instead of people being panicked at the event, they would have been out and watching for the plane… proud to see such a beautiful symbol of our nation over one of the world’s great cities.

I have no doubt that the folks at the head of the FAA thought this was a good idea- to keep this closely held to the vest. That’s a perfect example of why they are crummy at their jobs and need to either change or be removed, period.

I know I said that the Follies was going to be three days a week, but that’s my minimum goal; when I can’t help but write about something, it’ll be more.

Here’s a story that goes in the “I can’t make this up” file. A controller is reporting in to work for the first day of his workweek after a couple of days off. He’s called in by the supervisor for a meeting, but the NATCA rep is told it’s a performance issue and therefore no union representation will be allowed.

(And on a side note- how stupid is this? I don’t understand why managerial and supervisory types do this. Even if it really is a performance issue, if the employee would like a union rep, why not allow it? It would be erring on the side of caution and helping the employee feel more secure about what’s going on. Smart managers allow union reps at practically all meetings, just to keep things running smoothly.)

So what’s the meeting about? What performance of the controller’s is bad enough that it needs a formal meeting to correct it?

When filling out a delay log, the controller didn’t cross the “Z” in his operating initials (ZZ) in the log.

To remedy this situation, the controller was assigned to do some training and re-read the FAA’s order regarding air traffic control, the 7110.65.

Now, I’ll freely admit- the 7110 does indeed specify that controllers should use the little line in the middle when writing the letter “Z”. It’s to keep anyone from confusing it with the number “2″.

But here’s the thing- in the space for operating initials, the only thing that is supposed to be written in the box are letters. It’s not like someone has a letter/number combination for initials! They’re always two letters, at least at every FAA facility I’ve ever heard of.

In fact, the 7110 even says that in some instances it’s not required to write the slant-line through the number “0″ so you can tell it from the upper-case letter “O”, if there’s no chance for confusion (ie, if you are only writing numbers in a given area). There’s also no requirement to underline the letter “S” to differentiate it from the number “5″. (And after 18 years in the FAA, I had never known there WAS a requirement to underline the letter “S” if you’re hand-writing it until I was researching this blog item!)

To be hypertechnical, there is no such exclusion for the Z/2 combination, although there probably ought to be.

But here’s the thing: During a time period when the FAA is training like mad, when the controller workforce is understaffed (as evidenced by the large amounts of overtime being used), is it really a good idea for management to pull a controller off the control positions for over an hour to rag his butt for not crossing his “Z”s on a form in a column that will only contain LETTERS (no numbers) anyway?

Of course it isn’t. It’s incredibly, amazingly stupid, and it’s exactly this kind of crap that drives FAA employees nuts.

When you have managers who think this is more important than actually working traffic, it’s no wonder those same managers are so widely reviled and disrespected. This entire thing could be fixed in 30 seconds by the supervisor saying to the controller “hey, someone noticed you don’t cross your ‘Z’s when you filled out some delay log last week. Do me a favor and try to remember to cross them from now on, okay?” when the controller first walked in.

Boom, it’s a reasonable request, it gets to the heart of the so-called problem, and the controller would probably appreciate being treated like an adult. If the controller was a jerk about it, yeah, take it to a more formal level, but the way they did it? Incredibly dumb.

I’ve written a bit about ERAM in the Follies in the past. For those who don’t know, ERAM is basically the brain of the nation’s air traffic control system. Well, to be more correct, it’s the replacement for the brain; presently the ATC system runs on a software program known as “HOST”, and ERAM was scheduled to be in place this year to replace HOST.

The upgrade is needed to take advantage of all kinds of improvements in hardware and technology; unfortunately, there’s a bit of a problem. The FAA’s dirty little secret is that ERAM doesn’t work.

Oh, it’s close to working, but it doesn’t work YET, and by now it was supposed to basically be fully functional. Instead, there are a bunch of “workarounds” to do exactly that- work around all the bugs and non-functioning parts of the program.

What’s more, there are new bugs being discovered. Some of them are pretty major ones, too. Enroute controllers will understand this one- when you make a handoff to another center, and they accept the handoff, the CID of the airplane changes on your scope to the NEW center’s CID, and you get multiple flight plans into your URET (as noted by the little asterisk on the plane’s flight plan.)

For non-controllers, a rough equivalent of having to work around this would be that most of the time, clicking the left button of the mouse will let you grab and drag a window around the desktop of your computer, but occasionally you have to use the arrow keys on your keyboard instead.

At ZSE, we’re doing a round of ERAM training and the first part of today was spent in a briefing where they discussed some changes to operating procedures, orders that were rewritten to cover ERAM… oh, and several “this function we trained you on doesn’t work correctly now, and won’t when we turn ERAM on, so for now here’s a workaround. We don’t know when this will be fixed.”

The FAA finally brought NATCA into the process within the past month or so. There is a strong feeling in the union that the main reason is that they know the NATCA reps will come in, give ERAM a hard look, and be highly critical of all the crap that doesn’t work.

That way, the FAA can delay implementation significantly, but when called onto the carpet to defend this, they’ll just blame the union (again). “Oh, we were ready, but these guys came in and complained about all this stuff, so to placate them we delayed the program.”

In other words, since nobody in the FAA has consistenly had the guts to stand up and say what everyone in the FAA knows needed to be said (ie “This damn thing doesn’t work right yet; we need to slip it by at least a few months and get the rest of the bugs worked out instead of continually slipping it a week here and a week there!”) the FAA needs a scapegoat.

This is actually a pretty good chess move on the agency’s part. They know the software is messed up; they know they shouldn’t press onward with it; and by bringing in the union, they know they’ll be given a critique of the program that’s honest. Then they can blame THAT for the schedule slip.

Thing is that people are on to the FAA’s game here. NATCA has been telling Congress how the union has been locked out of meaningful input or review of FAA technological programs for years now. The FAA’s employees know how the agency works and aren’t fooled. And of course the controllers know perfectly well how things really are.

Anyway, the latest news is that ERAM has slipped again, they’re still FINDING bugs, they’re still fixing bugs (and occasionally bug “fixes” wind up creating more bugs) and nobody is really sure when the damn thing will be ready.

Rest assured, though, that in the end some manager somewhere will get an award for this debacle of a program.

Watching Hank Krakowski elaborate on the sad state of labor relations is so pathetic it’s almost funny.

I read the puff piece on Jerry Lavey’s blog-where Hank says he’s figured out what’s wrong with labor relations in the FAA. It’s so crystal clear, Hank says. I wonder if Hank is expecting to get a huge performance bonus for finding the missing key. Here’s what Jerry wrote:

Krakowski elaborated on what he called a key “missing component” in the groups’ interaction.

“We need some protocols that are well-established as to how we’re going do business in a business-like fashion,” he said.

Hmmmm…

We  need some protocols? That’s all we need Hank?

You’re kidding, right?

It would be sad, if it wasn’t so pathetic.

I got news for you, Hank. The Unions  have all known the protocols all along.

It’s you, and your Management flunkies who don’t know the protocols, Hank.

I’ll be kind today and give you a few hints.

The missing protocols you cannot find?  They are found in Chapter 71 of Title Five, United States Code, in the Code of Federal Regulations.

The law, Hank.  That’s where you’ll find the protocols.

Hank, if you’re not familiar with the protocols, they are contained in LAW AND REGULATION. See, Congress already thought long and hard about protocols, and developed them for you to follow years ago. But your folks still don’t get it.

Check out Title 5, Chapter 71 of the United States Code, and also the Code of Federal Regulations that flow from that.

Those are the protocols on what to do if you think the Union has proposed a non-negotiable item, for example.

If you think an item proposed is non-negotiable, it starts with a formal written declaration of non-negotiability. Of course, your folks refuse to hand over written statements of non-negotiability on a regular basis, Hank. They him and haw and try to avoid doing so. I’ve seen it literally hundreds of times. Because your folks, like you, don’t seem to know the protocol.

It starts with that written declaration of non-negotiability, and then requires the Union to file with the FLRA, and then the Agency must respond with it’s reasoning. Then, a panel at the FLRA gets to decide whether or not it’s negotiable.

Provided the FLRA rules that it IS negotiable, the Agency then has to sit down and actually negotiate over it. Details of the protocol on how to do a negotiability appeal are found in the Code of Federal Regulations, Sections 2424.1 through 2424.59.

That’s the protocol. It’s been the protocol for over 30 years of Federal labor relations law. But the FAA routinely ignores the law, and tries to find ways to appeal, ignore, obfuscate, reject, send it elsewhere, etc.

Time after time, you, they,  refuse to follow protocol and live with the result. You see, the FAA Agency Management and Agency Labor Relations people will do everything in their power to avoid, obfuscate, and generally ignore following the protocol called out in the law.

More of the missing protocol, Hank– is found in Title Five of the Code of Federal Regulations- CHAPTER XIV–FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND FEDERAL SERVICE IMPASSES PANEL.

There Hank, you will find the protocol for filing an unfair labor practice charge against an agency, when it routinely runs roughshod over it’s employees.

The Unions all follow the protocols religiously. Be late a day, and your charge it tossed out. Fail to sign the page with the statement of service, and your charge means nothing. We’ve suffered because of a minor missing signature enough times to know and understand the protocol involved.

It’s all contained in the protocols of 5 CFR Section 2423.0 through Section 2423.49. It even outlines there that you have to have a FLRA General Counsel in place in order to charge an agency with violating the law.

Since there is no General counsel at the moment, and hasn’t been for months, the Agency- YOUR Agency, knows that it can get away with violating employee rights, because there is no one that can charge the agency with wrong doing right now. Your people know that. And they do. The FLRA is backed up with over 400 cases right now, many of them cases of FAA Management folks violating the law in their dealings with employees. The cases are stacked up in FLRA regional offices all over the nation.

But sooner or later, that too will pass, when the new Administration is able to appoint a new General Counsel.

But you see Hank, that’s the protocol- the FLRA is the one who charges the Agency with violating the law, so us Union folk simply have to continue to file the right forms, within the correct time frames, and hope and pray that our people don’t lose their homes and careers while your people commit acts of terror on us.  We continue to fight, and continue to follow the legal rules of war.  We, sir, are honorable, and we follow the law.

Then there is the protocol for appealing an arbitrator’s ruling. You see, your people do it all the time. You lose in arbitration, where an arbitrator, based on the facts, makes a decision and orders you do something to correct a wrong you’ve done to an employee. Most times the Union simply accepts the Arbitrator’s decision.

But your folks, Hank? They don’t know the protocol. They think the protocol is always to appeal the arbitrator’s decision, regardless of the facts of the case.

Take a look at the listing of cases the FLRA has to decide on appeal. Ninety percent of the FAA cases are the Agency appealing an arbitrator’s decision. It makes for YEARS stretching out a case, when there isn’t an agency leg to stand on. But your folks do it, because they know it will cost the Union members money and time. The Union has limited resources to fight back- only the dues of it’s members. But the Agency has an unlimited bottomless pit of money to fight it’s own employees, and dozens of full time LR staff and lawyers dedicated to making life miserable for it’s workers. Yes, we know the protocols of appealing an arbitrator’s ruling. It’s contained in Part 2425 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

Then there is the protocol for Merit Systems Protection Board. And the protocol for EEO cases. And the protocols for the seven different employee class action lawsuits now pending before the Agency.

Most significant of the class actions now, however is the one known to all of us as the O’hara case. You know it as MALACHY COGHLAN Vs. MARY PETERS. It’s the case that Core Compers over the age of 40 filed showing that the Core Comp system violates the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.. The protocol there, Hank, is 29 U.S.C. § 621

https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2005cv1476-28

Earlier, that case was dismissed, because the judge said the Supreme Court decision on Lilly Ledbetter applied—that too much time had passed for the case to move forward.

Except now, as of this week, Lilly Ledbetter has a new law.

http://blogs.wsj.com/juggle/2009/01/29/lilly-ledbetter-act-are-you-being-paid-fairly/?mod=googlenews_wsj
And it means that all the over-40 FAA Core Compers who have hit the cap now have a legal claim each and every time they receive a paycheck that is lower than it should be. Each and every time, it’s a new offense.

Yes Hank, there are a few new protocols we need to work out.

I could go on and on for hours Hank, explaining to you the things you SHOULD already be versed in, but you are not.  How someone can get your job, and sit around saying “We need some protocols” is beyond belief.  It’s criminal. 

Instead, you sit up in D.C. and tell Jerry that everyone would be fine between the Agency Management slugs, and the real workers, if only you could work out some protocols with the Union.

Hank, do me, and the rest of us, a favor. Resign now. Go back to one of those bankrupt airline like where you can from. Let someone who has some competence in dealing with employee rights, with knowledge of federal labor law have the job you have now. We’ll all be better off with a clean start with someone new at the top.

And take Junior Joe Miniace, Ace Longshoreman Union buster from the West Coast with you. His advice has done you and the entire FAA  far more harm than good. He’s trouble- and isn’t doing you any favors. If you really want to get to know what a Joe is like, I suggest that you really ought to read more about his relationship with his last employer. It’s public knowledge, here: http://pub.bna.com/pbd/c043506a.pdf

If you want labor peace, it starts with YOU, Hank, understanding that the protocol you so desperately are looking for- well, they already exists.

And the animosity felt by those you have and continue to abuse is an issue much deeper rooted than you can possibly imagine.